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A Program of Leadership Instruction
for Junior Officers

by

T.O. Jacobs

U.S. Army Infantry Human Research Unit
Fort Benning, Georgia

Under the Technical Supervision of

The George Washington University
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
operating under contract with
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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CRD/J

SUBJECT: A Program of Leadership Instruction for Junior Officers

TO:

1. The attached HumRRO Technical Report, subject as above, is for
your information and retention.

2. The objective of the task described in this report was to devise
training methods and materials that would develop and improve junior
officer leadership skills. The program constructed approaches leadership
at the platoon working level and it emphasizes a functional approach. A
thorough analysis of the platoon leader's job in the military setting
served as the basic point of departure for the study.

3. The leadership training course developed can be expected to pro-
duce leaders who are more capable of accomplishing their missions, while
at the same time taking care of their men, because the teaching of the
fundamentals has been placed into realistic problem situations. This is
a significant conclusion of the report.

4. It is desired that interested agencies review this report with a
view toward making recommendations based on local experiences. Recommenda-
tions should be processed through appropriate headquarters.

FOR THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:

1 Incl
as

JACK M. DUNCAN
Colonel, GS
Chief, Human Factors and Operations
Research Division

A PROGRAM OF LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION
FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS

by

T.O. Jacobs

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Task OFFTRAIN IV

COMPOSITION OF RESEARCH TEAM

Dr. T.O. Jacobs served as Task Leader. Mr. Reginald C. Rahn, Mr. John J. Macisco, and 2d Lt. Charles B. Moore took part in the development of the leadership training course. Col. Henry E. Kelly (USA Ret.) contributed substantially to the development of the final course through careful reviews of early drafts of training materials. Lt. Col. Lyman H. Clark was Chief of the Unit during development of the program.

Staff members of the Instructor Training Section, U.S. Army Infantry School, tape-recorded the practical exercises used in the course.

1. PROBLEM. The purpose of this research was to develop training methods and materials that would teach effective leadership skills prior to a junior leader's first assignment to troop duty.

2. METHOD. In OFFTRAIN IV findings from previous subtasks of Task OFF-TRAIN provided the basis for developing improved leadership instruction. Practical exercises were developed from actual incidents of both effective and ineffective leader actions that had appeared most frequently in the earlier research; they constitute a sample of the problems the newly assigned junior officer is most likely to encounter. In conjunction with the practical exercises, a student textbook, *Basic Problems in Small-Unit Leadership*, was prepared, covering conceptual material on effective leadership. These materials were combined to form a 16-hour Program of Instruction in leadership. An *Instructor's Guide*, containing guidelines and lesson plans for the course, and a *Practical Exercises* handbook were prepared for the instructor, together with a set of tape-recorded skits. The Program of Instruction was administered three times to platoon leaders of OVUREP battle groups.

3. RESULTS. Student ratings of the course, obtained immediately after each try-out, were generally favorable both on specific elements and on the course in general. Four months after the third tryout, follow-up ratings were obtained from the group given the final form of the course. These ratings, as well as comments obtained from actual and potential users, were also generally favorable.

4. CONCLUSIONS

a. The course was well received and the students benefited from application of the training in their later experience in platoon assignments.

b. On the basis of comments by potential and actual users, the practical exercises are considered to be realistic and to reflect the kinds of problems junior officers will encounter. The instructional materials can be administered without special training for instructors, permitting the implementation of the course in a wide variety of decentralized locations.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that the training course

a. Be incorporated in the Army Advanced ROTC Program.

b. Be used in appropriate service schools at the officer candidate and orientation levels. ——

c. Be furnished to active Army and reserve components, and Army National Guard State Officer Candidate Schools for use in junior officer schools.

d. Be published in appropriate Department of the Army publication media.

A. MILITARY PROBLEM

1. Effective accomplishment of assigned missions is the goal of all military units and the ultimate standard by which they are judged. Many factors contribute to effective unit performance. One is the leader's ability to build a high level of individual and unit proficiency and, at the same time, to develop high motivation and morale. At present, these leader skills are acquired primarily through actual experience in a troop unit. A leader's first troop assignment may be viewed as a laboratory in which he learns the practical skills of everyday leadership. Consequently, junior leaders can be expected to make errors that decrease unit effectiveness and reduce motivation and morale.

2. The objective of Task OFFTRAIN was to evolve training methods and materials that would develop and improve leadership skills prior to a junior leader's first assignment to troop duty.

B. RESEARCH PROBLEM

1. Analysis of the platoon leader's job indicates that his influence on his unit is determined mainly by how he deals with subordinates in accomplishing assigned tasks. The platoon leader must perform these functions:

    a. Coordinate his men's efforts toward efficient accomplishment of assigned unit tasks.

    b. Evaluate individual and unit performance, giving recognition for good work and making corrections where necessary.

    c. Determine the cause of performance failures, distinguishing between inadequate ability and inadequate motivation. (Remedial actions must be correspondingly different.)

    d. Eliminate personal or other problems within his unit, to the extent that he can, to prevent them from interfering with effective accomplishment of assigned tasks.

2. The research problem was to identify specific leader actions that serve these functions and to determine how to teach the necessary skills to junior leaders prior to their first troop duty assignment.

C. RESEARCH METHOD

1. In Subtask IV of Task OFFTRAIN, research findings on leadership behavior, collected in previous subtasks, provided the basis for developing improved leadership instruction.

    a. In OFFTRAIN II, accounts had been obtained of how platoon leaders in a TOE division dealt with subordinates in the performance of duty. These accounts were analyzed in terms of the leader's effectiveness in getting assigned tasks completed efficiently and in terms of the impact of his actions on the motivation of his unit.

b. In OFFTRAIN III, a study of platoon leaders in a training division demonstrated that effective leader actions there were similar to those found in the TOE division, thereby confirming the findings of the earlier study.

c. Most of the leader activities identified as critical in these two earlier studies fell into four categories:

(1) Setting platoon goals and standards

(2) Motivating performance

(3) Using and supporting NCO's

(4) Handling disruptive influences

Analysis indicated that problems within these areas typically arose when the leader failed to recognize, in the leadership situation, a demand for some action on his part, or when he failed to identify the nature of the action required.

2. The leadership course developed in OFFTRAIN IV from these findings emphasizes analysis of leadership problems in the four critical areas previously identified, in terms of functional leadership—that is, the functions a leader must perform to satisfy the needs of the unit.

a. Practical exercises have been developed from actual incidents of both effective and ineffective leader actions. Most are in the form of tape-recorded skits concerning problem situations. Some require students to furnish solutions; others depict solutions that students are required to critique. Additional practical exercises are in the form of discussion topics that deal with more complex leadership problems. In all cases, the practical exercises have been drawn from incidents that appeared most frequently in the earlier research, and thus constitute a sample of the problems the junior officer is most likely to encounter during his first assignment to troop duty.

b. A student textbook, *Basic Problems in Small-Unit Leadership*, has been prepared for study in conjunction with the practical exercises. The primary purpose of the textbook is to give students an understanding of functional leadership by explaining why some leader actions are effective and others are not. This material constitutes a meaningful framework for studying the kind of leadership problems presented in the practical exercises.

3. The practical exercises and the student textbook have been combined to form a 16-hour Program of Instruction in leadership.

a. This course places primary emphasis on helping the student to acquire an *understanding* of small-unit leadership and certain elementary skills in *solving* basic leadership problems. Small-group discussion techniques, which have been demonstrated to be effective in accomplishing these aims, are used intensively throughout the course.

b. Two volumes were prepared as an aid to the instructor.

(1) An *Instructor's Guide*, which contains (a) introductory material providing both general guidelines and detailed procedures for presenting the course and for handling the small-group discussions, (b) detailed lesson plans, complete even to full-length lectures, for presenting all 16 hours of instruction, and (c) notes to the instructor that indicate how his students are likely to react to the various practical exercises and how he can handle these reactions.

(2) A *Practical Exercises* handbook,, which contains (a) all the practical exercises, (b) a summary sheet for each of the tape-recorded skits, outlining the important points students should cover in their small-group discussions, and (c) the final examination for the course.

4. As a final step, this Program of Instruction was presented three times to platoon leaders in Oversea Unit Replacement (OVUREP) battle groups.[1] The first two presentations were tryouts of preliminary forms; the third was a tryout of the final form of the course.

5. Reactions to the course were evaluated by collecting data in the form of (a) questionnaires completed by students immediately after the course, (b) questionnaires completed by students in the final group four months after finishing the course, (c) comments by potential users after review of the materials, and (d) comments by actual users, based on their experience with the course.

6. The materials used in the final tryout of the course were prepared in the form of a training package suitable for implementation.[2] This package was designed to permit administration of the course in decentralized locations by instructors without special training for the assignment. It consists of (a) the student textbook, *Basic Problems in Small-Unit Leadership;* and (b) instruction materials, *Instructor's Guide, Practical Exercises,* and a set of tape-recorded skits.

D. RESULTS

1. Student reactions to the course were generally good.

a. Student ratings of specific elements of the course and of the course in general were obtained immediately following its completion. Nearly 70 percent of the ratings were above the midpoint on a five-point scale. When indicating willingness to recommend this training for other leaders, students placed nearly 80 percent of their ratings above the midpoint.

b. Similar ratings were obtained four months later from platoon leaders who had taken the final form of the course. The favorability of these follow-up ratings is of particular importance: The four months had been filled with intensive Basic Unit Training and Advanced Unit Training, because of a change in the battle group's primary mission. This unanticipated experience should have given these platoon leaders an above-average opportunity to judge whether the OFFTRAIN leadership course actually was good preparation for problems that were certain to have arisen during this period.

c. Supplementary written comments obtained from these leaders during the follow-up indicated even more strongly that the course had been of practical value. A typical statement was that the course had been a foundation on which they could build without making too many mistakes. Several noted that they had been better prepared to handle problems because they remembered discussing in class the same problem or a

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[1] All three administrations of the OFFTRAIN course took place during the "B" Cadre Phase of the battle group's organization cycle. This phase is devoted to cadre training activities prior to assignment of the battle group's full complement of troops from replacement centers.

[2] The training package is being used as interim implementation material by Army ROTC units.

similar one. Others suggested that the course should be required for every newly commissioned officer as an introduction to troop duty. There were virtually no criticisms of the course.

2. Comments from actual users—the division in which the tryouts were conducted and two ROTC faculties that had independently tried the course on a modified basis—indicated that the content of the practical exercises was realistic and that the practice students obtained from these exercises would be useful in subsequent leadership situations. Reactions from these sources also indicated that students had liked the course and that materials prepared for instructor use had been of great value and entirely adequate for presenting the course without additional preparation.

3. Comments from potential users—ROTC faculties, STRAC divisions, other TOE divisions, and service schools—were similar to those of the actual users with regard to the practical exercises and the student textbook. They felt that the course would be successful in relating leadership theory to the everyday situations that face the junior leader.

E. CONCLUSIONS

1. On the basis of student reactions, both immediately after completion of the course and four months later, it was concluded that the course had been received favorably by the students and that they had benefited from it in their subsequent experience with their platoons.

2. On the basis of comments by potential and actual users, it was concluded that:

a. The practical exercises are realistic and reflect the kinds of problems junior officers will encounter.

b. The instructional materials are sufficiently complete for the course to be administered without special training for instructors. It should be possible to implement the course in a wide variety of decentralized locations.

3. On the basis of the methods used to develop the course concepts and content, and of user and student reactions, it was concluded that the course will be of substantial value in leadership training. By teaching the fundamentals of how to deal with soldiers in realistic problem situations, the course can be expected to produce leaders who are more capable of accomplishing their missions and taking care of their men.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that this training course

1. Be incorporated into the Army Advanced ROTC program.[1]

2. Be utilized in appropriate service schools at the officer candidate and orientation levels, taking action necessary to avoid duplication.

3. Be furnished to active Army and reserve component units, and Army National Guard State Officer Candidate Schools for use in junior officer schools.

4. Be published in appropriate Department of the Army publication media.

[1]This recommendation was implemented by letter, Hq., USCONARC, subject: Briefings on Leadership Program of Instruction for ROTC, 10 March 1962.

CONTENTS

A PROGRAM OF LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION
FOR JUNIOR OFFICERS

BACKGROUND

To be effective, leadership training should produce—
- (1) An <u>understanding of the behavior of the effective leader</u> in terms of why that behavior <u>is</u> effective, and
- (2) The <u>ability to apply this understanding</u> to new situations.

Military leadership is currently taught to junior officers primarily in terms of the traits of the leader and the principles of leadership. Leadership traits are defined as "Personal qualities of direct value to the leader in gaining the willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation of his men in accomplishing his mission."[1] Leadership principles are defined as "Fundamental guidelines for the selection of appropriate actions and orders in the proper exercise of command."[2]

The effectiveness of this approach to leadership instruction is limited by the fact that <u>knowledge</u> of these traits and principles is not sufficient in itself to enable the leader to handle the leadership situations he will face in his own unit. The ability to identify a problem and to analyze it accurately is of major importance. Without skills in these two areas, the leader is at a loss to apply the principles of leadership because he has no adequate basis for deciding which of them are applicable.

These considerations suggest the kind of leadership instruction that is needed by inexperienced junior officers. Their training should emphasize practice in problem solving, using realistic practical exercises chosen to depict the ordinary, day-to-day leadership situations that the small-unit leader most frequently encounters. In dealing with these practical exercises, students should be concerned with the actions of the leader and the effects these actions have—first, on the ability of his unit to accomplish assigned missions and second, on the morale of his men and their motivation to do good work.

The validity of such an approach to leadership training was demonstrated in Project TRAINLEAD, the first subtask in the Task OFFTRAIN series.[3] Sound motion pictures were produced to present realistic leadership problem situations for solution by students in the classroom. It was expected that students, in reaching solutions, would think in terms of the <u>actions</u> the leader might take and his reasons for choosing certain actions in preference to others. Students given an experimental leadership training course, using these sound films as an instructional medium, were then compared with students given the leadership instruction current at that time. The experimentally trained classes performed

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[1]Reference 1, p. 3.
[2]*Ibid.*
[3]Reference 7.

significantly better than did conventionally trained classes in solving a set of leadership problem situations.[1]

At the end of this subtask, it was evident that work of a considerably broader nature would be profitable. This first study had been oriented primarily toward determining the effectiveness of sound motion pictures for presenting leadership problems as a part of leadership instruction. It had not been designed to provide a comprehensive knowledge of effective and ineffective leader actions. However, it was evident that effective leadership instruction would need as its basis just such a systematic and comprehensive understanding of leadership.

Research to develop the necessary factual basis for leadership instruction was undertaken in OFFTRAIN II and III. The findings from these studies provided the foundation for the leadership course developed in OFFTRAIN IV, which is described in this report. Subtasks II and III have been reported previously,[2] but will be described briefly in the following section to provide an understanding of the findings on which the leadership instruction was based and the methods by which these findings were obtained.

ESTABLISHING A FACTUAL BASIS FOR LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION

Research Approach

OFFTRAIN II was designed to develop systematic and comprehensive information about leadership behavior which could serve as the basis for leadership instruction. In the early stages of this subtask, the problem of studying leadership was conceptualized as " . . . a part of the general problem of studying social interaction with special emphasis on social influence processes."[3]

This conceptualization was substantially influenced by theories of personality—for example, that of Rotter[4]—that emphasize the interpersonal nature of human behavior. It also reflected a need for considering the " . . . situational context in which the leader is studied,"[5] which had been emphasized by other students of leadership such as Sanford[6] who stressed the following three facets of leadership phenomena: (1) the leader and his psychological attributes; (2) the follower with his problems, attitudes, and needs; and (3) the group situation within which followers and leaders relate to one another.

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[1]As a result of this research, the Army adopted the TRAINLEAD film concept and developed several series of TRAINLEAD films under the direction of the Leadership Committee at Fort Benning. These official Army training films are now available for Army-wide use in leadership training.

[2]References 5 and 6. Copies of these reports may be obtained from the Office of the Director, Human Resources Research Office, 300 N. Washington St., Alexandria 14, Va.

[3]Reference 5, p. 3.

[4]Reference 8.

[5]Reference 5, p. 3.

[6]Reference 9, pp. 17-75.

Initial analysis of small-unit leadership indicated the necessity to concentrate on "specific, observable behaviors of the leader within a range of group goal-relevant situations."[1] This analysis led to the development of six general propositions that, in turn, guided the research:

(1) The leader serves a <u>functional</u> role in his unit—that is, he satisfies unit needs.

(2) This functional role is based partly on the fact that the unit must regularly accomplish assigned missions and thus requires (a) internal organization, to ensure that each unit member's individual efforts are most efficiently used in accomplishing these missions; and (b) coordination with adjacent and higher units, to ensure that the unit's efforts as a whole mesh with the efforts of other units and satisfy requirements placed on it by higher units.

(3) The leader's functional role also is based partly on the fact that unit members are motivated to help accomplish unit missions, primarily because this is an indirect way of satisfying personal needs, and only secondarily because of intrinsic interest in the tasks themselves. If the unit member's individual efforts do not result in satisfying his personal needs, he will not be nearly so well motivated to do assigned work.

(4) The leader's influence within the unit depends on his ability to fill these two general roles, that is, to guide the unit to efficient accomplishment of assigned missions and to ensure that individual unit members receive appropriate recognition for their efforts in the accomplishment of these missions.

(5) The leader's fulfillment of these two general roles is mediated principally through his interactions with his unit, as a whole and with individual members of his unit, on task-related matters.

(6) Thus, the leader's influence within his unit is determined by his interactions with his unit as a whole and with individual members of his unit on task- or work-related matters.

In OFFTRAIN II, information was collected on the day-to-day leadership behaviors of a sample of 42 platoon leaders drawn from two TOE Infantry regiments located at an Army post in the United States. The platoons had been involved in training for and taking squad and platoon tests shortly before the data were collected. In addition, several of the platoons had participated in an Alaskan maneuver.

Interviews were held with six to eight subordinates of each platoon leader. Emphasis was placed on getting reports of actual behavior rather than inferences or judgments about behavior.

In asking platoon members for descriptions of leader actions in situations relevant to group goals, the interviewers used a standard set of questions regarding the leader's behavior in each of the following situations: (1) job assigning or planning, (2) job in process and being done poorly, (3) job in process and being done well, (4) job completed and done poorly, (5) job completed and done well, (6) replacements entering unit, (7) promotions or changes in assignment, (8) group members making complaints or suggestions, and (9) unexpected event occurring.

[1]Reference 5, p. 4.

A content analysis was made to process the data into behavior variable scores, and categories or types of leader behavior that occurred in the various task-oriented situations were derived from the interview data. These leader behavior variables were then related to criteria which included ratings of the leader by subordinates within his unit,[1] and by his superiors. Leader behavior variables that were associated with high ratings by subordinates and superiors were assumed to reflect effective practices; variables associated with low ratings were assumed to reflect ineffective practices.

Research Findings on the Leader's Functional Role

Several important functions of the effective leader emerged from this analysis.[2] First, the effective leader frequently interacts with his subordinates to give information that facilitates improvement of performance. In performance situations in which there has been a failure to meet acceptable standards, the leader plays an active role in describing what was done unsatisfactorily and how improvement can be achieved. The clarity with which he does this is also an important variable.

Second, the effective leader urges high standards of performance when assigning work. He frequently promises rewards for good performance, but rarely threatens specific punishments that will follow poor performance. It is particularly significant that leaders who set standards too high and leaders who set standards too low are both perceived as ineffective.

Third, the effective leader consistently uses appropriate rewards and punishments as recognition for the quality of task performance of individuals within the unit. Further, the findings strongly suggest that highly regarded leaders distribute rewards and punishments solely on the basis of performance. The effective leader rarely was found to be inconsistent in his reactions to performance—that is, overevaluating performance on one occasion and underevaluating it on another occasion.

A fourth leadership function is handling disruptive influences. Problems or needs of unit members, if not given attention, may become distracting or disruptive and thus decrease the ability of unit members to do good work. Leader behaviors in this area include such actions as helping men with personal problems (e.g., obtaining an emergency loan) and taking care of their physical welfare. These behaviors are indirectly related to the performance potential of the unit in that they prevent performance decrements that would otherwise occur.

The fifth function is getting information from unit members. This is important in the sense that it helps the leader to perform the above four functions adequately. Results show that questioning both subordinate leaders and other unit members to obtain information and

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[1]Ratings by subordinates were not considered to be objective ratings, but rather subjective expressions of the subordinates' attitudes toward the leader. Since the ratings were basically combat-oriented, they were considered to reflect the willingness of the subordinates to follow the leader into combat.

[2]Reference 5.

suggestions is characteristic of highly regarded leaders. Showing discrimination in reacting to suggestions—accepting good suggestions and rejecting poor ones—is also related to perceived effectiveness. These findings suggest that the effective leader encourages participation of unit members by asking for advice and suggestions, but retains his decision-making power. It is of special interest to note that checking reasons for failure is characteristic of highly regarded leaders. Only if such reasons are known can the leader, on the one hand give information that will lead to improved performance, and on the other hand distinguish between ability failures and motivational failures for purposes of taking appropriate corrective actions.

In the leadership course developed in OFFTRAIN IV, these functions were categorized into the following four areas, which constitute the functional role of the platoon leader:

(1) Setting platoon goals and standards
(2) Motivating performance
(3) Using and supporting NCO's
    Handling disruptive influences

Cross-Validation of Findings

In the OFFTRAIN III research, a Leader Activities Questionnaire (LAQ) was constructed from the findings of the previous subtask. The LAQ items consisted of behavior statements, for example, "He told you he wanted you to do a good job," or "He pulled a man's pass for fouling up an important job." In the LAQ, items were presented in groups, each group dealing with a platoon leader's behavior in a specific kind of situation. For each item in each group, the respondent was asked to indicate how frequently he had observed that particular behavior during the previous month.

The LAQ was administered to members of 46 platoons in a training division. Ratings were also obtained on the platoon leaders, from both subordinates and superiors. In scoring the LAQ, the behavior statements were grouped into variables much like those identified in OFFTRAIN II.

These behavior variables were then correlated with the ratings, and their relationships were found to be in substantial agreement with those of the preceding study.[1] Essentially the same leader behaviors were important both in the training division and in the TOE division that had been studied previously. On the basis of the similarity between the two sets of findings, it was concluded that the leader behaviors identified in both these studies constitute a realistic and factual basis for leadership training.

DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

Rationale for the Course

The findings of OFFTRAIN II and III resulted in a definition of the functional role of a leader in a small military unit. The purpose of

[1]Reference 6.

OFFTRAIN IV was to develop a program of instruction to teach this functional role to junior officers, with the objective of producing actual increases in the leadership skills of students so that their behavior when they were assigned to lead troop units would be more effective.

In developing the course, seven assumptions were made about the nature of effective leadership training:

(1) The effectiveness of the leader—his ability to develop high unit motivation to accomplish assigned goals—is determined in large part by his influence over his men.

(2) Effective leadership training, therefore, must give each student an understanding of how to develop influence over his men. This, in turn, requires an understanding of the functional role of the small-unit leader.

(a) The student must understand and accept both the guidance and coordination roles of the leader.

(b) He must understand the motives and needs of his men so that he can appropriately reward their performance on assigned tasks.

(3) Two basic difficulties in applying such knowledge are recognizing the existence of a unit problem—or, if possible, anticipating its development—and analyzing the problem in terms of the factors that led to its development.

(4) Thus, a primary goal in leadership training must be to develop these perceptual and analytic skills—that is, to teach the student to identify the important factors in leadership situations and to place these factors in their correct order of importance.

(5) Such skills can be taught only by giving students the opportunity to analyze many different leadership problem situations, with subsequent feedback on the adequacy of their responses. This feedback must emphasize the factors that the leader should consider when deciding what leadership actions are demanded by the given situation.

(6) The maximum benefit from such training will be achieved if the problem situations are systematically chosen to cover most or all the important factors or types of problem that the student will face in actual practice.

(7) The use of small-group discussion methods in training will maximize student participation and this, in turn, will produce maximal training impact on the student.

These assumptions shaped the form of the leadership course. In broad outline, the course was built around small-group discussions of situations involving realistic leadership problems. These discussions were oriented toward identifying the important factors in the problem situation that the leader should consider when making a decision, and their relative importance to one another. The over-all series of practical exercises was designed to cover (1) the most representative problems encountered by the small-unit leader, and (2) the range of important factors that he should consider when making decisions. It was intended that students should acquire sensitivity to and understanding of the kinds of problems they would be most likely to meet when they were assigned to positions of platoon leadership.

Thus, the immediate objective of the course was not to produce polished leaders, but rather to give the inexperienced leader a head start, so that even in his first actual encounter with his own platoon he would be able to act with a level of maturity otherwise acquired only after a substantial period of leadership experience.

A second and considerably longer-range objective was to provide the basis for continued leadership development far beyond the immediate time frame of the course. By teaching the concept of functional leadership, the course was also designed to give the student insight into leadership problems that he would experience in subsequent leadership assignments. This understanding would enable the officer to profit substantially more—and with rapidity—from his actual leadership experiences, and thus eventually to reach higher levels of leadership ability than would otherwise have been possible.

Instructional Materials and Their Uses

Two kinds of practical exercises were developed for this course: tape-recorded skits that depict the development of situations producing leadership problems, and discussion topics that present more complex situations of this type. Both kinds of practical exercises were developed from actual incidents found by the researchers to occur frequently.

The tape-recorded skits present the problems in two different ways. Some skits depict a leader working through a problem situation. Students in small discussion groups are then required to analyze the leader's actions from the standpoint of their effectiveness in facilitating the accomplishment of the unit's mission. Students are asked to consider how the leader's actions affect both the motivation and the ability of his subordinates to accomplish the assigned tasks.

In other skits, the problem is developed to a critical point, then the skit is interrupted while the students develop solutions to the problem. After they discuss their solutions, the remaining scenes present the actions of the leader working through the problem situation, either effectively or ineffectively. Students are often asked also to critique the leader's actions in these follow-up scenes.

Discussion topics—the other type of practical exercise—are used in much the same manner as the tape-recorded skits. Students discuss these topics in small groups to determine the important factors that should affect the leader's decision in such situations, and the kind of decision that these factors would lead him to make.

The discussions that are part of both types of practical exercise were intended to help develop analysis skills useful to inexperienced leaders in their first assignment to troop duty. It was hypothesized that students given a chance to think out these practice problems, in a situation in which there is no risk attached to an incorrect decision, would be better prepared to cope with such problems when they are encountered on the job.

Conceptual materials were also developed for use in conjunction with the practical exercises. They are presented in a relatively short

student textbook which provides a brief introduction to organization theory as it pertains to small military groups, followed by an introduction to the study of individual motivation in small, task-oriented groups such as infantry platoons. These sections set the stage for an understanding of the remaining parts of the textbook, which deal with the functional role of the leader in terms of the actual day-to-day activities of the small-unit leader and how these actions influence the leader's subordinates. The over-all purpose of the textbook is to teach the student how to understand his future subordinates, and thus to provide a meaningful framework for studying the leadership problems presented in the practical exercises.

The Program of Instruction

The practical exercises and the conceptual material were combined in a 16-hour leadership training course. The course is in two parts: Part I is devoted to development of the concept of functional leadership derived from the textbook previously described. Part II is devoted to intensive practice in the application of functional leadership to problem situations, in the form of practical exercises. However, even in Part I, practical work is heavily emphasized. As can be seen from the course outline in Table 1, four of the first nine hours are devoted entirely to practical exercises, and two more contain some practical exercise material. In all the lessons, specific leadership problems are related to the leader's functional role within the unit, so that the student can understand, at a practical workaday level, why some leadership actions are effective and others are not.

In all, three volumes of training materials were produced. The first is a leadership textbook for student use Basic Problems in Small-Unit Leadership.[1] This textbook contains the conceptual material described earlier; a listing of the topics it covers is presented in Appendix A.

The second volume, the Instructor's Guide,[2] contains both general and specific guidance for conducting the course. The first section of the Guide contains an introduction to the theory of leadership instruction. Various forms of classroom instruction are discussed in terms of this theory. This section also gives detailed guidelines for presenting the course, including specific guidance on the use of small-group discussion methods and directions for handling conference presentations. Finally, the instructor's special role in the class is outlined and related to the over-all theory of leadership training.

The second section of the Instructor's Guide contains detailed lesson plans for both practical exercises and conference classes. The lesson plans contain notes to the instructor that describe reactions his students are likely to have to the practical exercises, thus helping him to anticipate these responses and to handle them adaptively. A sample lesson plan, illustrating both conference and practical exercise presentations, is given in Appendix B.

[1]Reference 2.
[2]Reference 4.

Table 1

Course Outline:
Basic Problems in Small-Unit Leadership

Hour	Type	Title
Part I. Development of Conceptual Material		
1	Conference	Introduction Organizational Context of Leadership
2	Practical Exercises	Setting Platoon Goals and Standards
3	Conference Practical Exercises	Setting Platoon Goals and Standards Motivating Performance
4	Practical Exercises	Motivating Performance
5	Conference Practical Exercises	Motivating Performance NCO Use and Support
6	Practical Exercises	NCO Use and Support
7	Conference	NCO Use and Support
8	Practical Exercises	Handling Disruptive Influences
9	Conference	Handling Disruptive Influences
Part II. Practical Application of Conceptual Material		
10	Practical Exercises	General
11	Practical Exercises	General
12	Practical Exercises	General
13	Practical Exercises	General
14	Practical Exercises	General Student Discussion Topics
15	Practical Exercises	Student Discussion Topics
16	Final Examination	

The third volume, Practical Exercises,[1] contains scripts for the tape-recorded skits, detailed analyses of the skits in terms of the teaching points that should be emphasized in the student discussions, and the discussion topics. This volume, which is designed solely for instructor use, provides important guidance to the desired content of the class discussions. A sample skit and its accompanying analysis are presented in Appendix C.

TRYOUTS OF THE COURSE

It was decided not to make an experimental evaluation of the OFFTRAIN course. To conduct such an evaluation, it would have been necessary to (1) give the training to a sample of junior leaders, (2) allow a period of time after training, during which the leaders would interact with functioning platoons, and (3) conduct a follow-up

[1]Reference 3.

study comparing the effectiveness of leaders who had received the OFFTRAIN course with those who had not.

The most important problem was the amount of time that would have been needed for such an evaluation. The OFFTRAIN instruction is oriented toward the development of positive motivation in a leader's subordinates. A substantial period of time is often required, even by highly effective and experienced leaders, to produce the desired positive motivation in subordinates. This time requirement would have compounded the administrative difficulties involved in following up an adequate sample of junior officers, who typically receive assignments in a variety of locations. Further, achievement of another major objective of the course—the long-term improvement in the officer's ability to profit from his experience as a leader—could not be measured by any short-range evaluation.

However, the decision against experimental evaluation of the course was not based solely on such considerations. Other essential factors indicated strongly that this step might not be necessary. First, the content of the leadership course had been derived from the findings of systematic research on the leadership process in small military units of the type for which leaders were being prepared by the course. Thus, the course content was factually based and realistically oriented. Second, the training methods utilized to teach this content were based directly on the methods employed in TRAINLEAD (OFFTRAIN I), which had been evaluated experimentally and found to be effective. Thus, the OFFTRAIN course was based both on factually sound content and on training methods of demonstrated effectiveness.

The alternative to experimental evaluation was to obtain appraisals of the course and training materials by (1) students who took the training, (2) senior officers who reviewed the materials and/or observed the training, and (3) the research staff who observed the reactions of officer students during training.

Three tryouts of the leadership course were conducted with platoon leaders from Oversea Unit Replacement (OVUREP)[1] battle groups at Fort Benning.[2] There were 18 students in the first tryout, 12 in the second, and 11 in the third. These represented all the platoon leaders available in the battle groups at the time the course was given.

The active duty experience of the trainees, including both enlisted and commissioned duty, ranged from 1 to nearly 8 years in the first tryout, from 8 months to nearly 4 years in the second tryout, and from 1 month to nearly 12 years in the third tryout. Approximately half the officers in the first and third tryout groups, and about a fourth of the officers in the second tryout group, had graduated from Officer Candidate School. The remaining officers were preponderantly ROTC graduates.

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[1]An OVUREP battle group is distinguished by the nature of its mission, which includes eventual overseas movement, as a unit, to replace another battle group.

[2]In all three tryouts, the course was administered during the "B" Cadre Phase of the battle group's organization cycle. This phase is devoted to cadre training activities prior to assignment of privates to the battle group.

After the first tryout, and again after the second, modifications were made in course materials and presentation in the light of experience gained during administration of the course. In all three tryouts, classes were held on consecutive duty days. For the first and third tryouts, each session lasted one hour; for the second tryout, each session was one and a half hours. All classes met during the last quarter of the day, that is, between 3 and 5 p.m.

Students anonymously rated the course on the day following the last class. The rating scales used are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Student Ratings After Each Tryout of the Leadership Course

Question	Average Rating
1. To what extent do you feel this course has been helpful to you?	▼ ▼ ▽ (above scale between 2 and 3) 0 1 2 3 4 Little or no help ..... Very helpful
2. To what extent do you feel this training will be useful to you in your future development as an officer?	▼ ▼▽ 0 1 2 3 4 Little or no help ..... Very helpful
3. To what extent has this training increased your understanding of platoon leadership?	▼ ▼ ▽ 0 1 2 3 4 Little or no help ..... Very helpful
4. Did you find it helpful to talk over your own leadership problems with your fellow officers in this course?	▼ ▼ ▽ 0 1 2 3 4 Little or no help ..... Very helpful
5. How interesting did you find the course?	▼ ▼▼ 0 1 2 3 4 Little or no interest ..... Very interesting
6. As far as you know, to what extent did the other platoon leaders find the training helpful or useful?	▼ ▼ ▽ 0 1 2 3 4 Little or no help ..... Very helpful
7. Would you be willing to recommend this training to other (platoon leaders) (officers)?	▼ ▼ ▽ 0 1 2 3 4 Little or no willingness ..... Very willing
8. How valuable do you think this training would be for inexperienced platoon leaders?	▼ ▼▼ 0 1 2 3 4 Little or no value ..... Very valuable

▽ First tryout (N=18)   ▼ Second tryout (N=12)   ▼ Third tryout (N=11)

In addition, members of the third tryout group, to whom the final form of the course had been given, were asked for follow-up ratings four months after they had completed the course. Because this period had been filled with intensive unit training,[1] it was thought that the officer students would have had more than ample opportunity to make further judgments as to the value of the course. Their ratings of the course should have been lower at this time if the training had not been of value to them during the intervening period.

The student ratings were taken as valid indicators only of student acceptance of the course. While important, these ratings were only indirectly related to the degree of impact the course might have had on the students' subsequent behavior in leadership situations. Evaluations by senior officers, similarly, were not regarded as criteria of actual course effectiveness, but rather as indicators of the scope and representativeness of the practical exercises used in the course, and thus an index of the likelihood that the training would, in fact, be applicable in the solution of problem situations that the students might subsequently meet in their assignments as platoon leaders.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Student Ratings

The students' ratings of the course following the three tryouts are summarized in Table 2. In this table, the arrows show the average of all the student responses to each question for each of the three classes. Thus, for question 1, the mean was 3.5 for the first class; 2.4, for the second class; and 3.1 for the third class.

Student reactions were most favorable in the first administration of the course, and least favorable in the second. The differences between reactions following the first and third tryouts are minor, so that the reactions can be regarded as roughly equal. Both were quite favorable. The reason for the lower ratings by students in the second tryout is not clear. One explanation might be that the class periods were too long—1 1/2 hours per day instead of 1 hour per day as in the other two tryouts. This is by no means a certainty, because other changes were made for the third administration of the course, in addition to resumption of the 1-hour session each day.

Even though the reactions of the second group were less favorable, the over-all picture is one of acceptance. The students apparently enjoyed the course and felt that they had profited from the training.

This conclusion is strongly supported by the results of the follow-up study of the officers who received the final form of the course. At the end of a 4-month period, 8 of the 11 officers who originally rated the course responded to the follow-up questionnaire. In Table 3, their original ratings are compared with their later responses to the same

Table 3

Student Ratings at End of Third Tryout
of the Leadership Course and Four Months Later
(N=8)

Question	Average Rating				
1. To what extent do you feel this course has been helpful to you?				▼ ▽	
	0 Little or no help	1	2	3	4 Very helpful
2. To what extent do you feel this training will be useful to you in your future development as an officer?				▼▽	
	0 Little or no help	1	2	3	4 Very helpful
3. To what extent has this training increased your understanding of platoon leadership?			▼	▽	
	0 Little or no help	1	2	3	4 Very helpful
4. On the basis of the past four months' experience, would you now be willing to recommend this training to other platoon leaders?				▽ ▼	
	0 Not willing	1	2	3	4 Very willing
5. On the basis of the past four months' experience, how valuable do you now think this training would be for inexperienced platoon leaders?				▼ ▽	
	0 Little or no help	1	2	3	4 Very helpful

▽ End of third tryout   ▼ Four months after third tryout

questions. The two sets of responses are quite similar. While the follow-up ratings are slightly lower on four of the five questions, the differences are not statistically significant.

The same acceptance is indicated by these officers in a second part of the questionnaire, about materials used in the course and about the course in general. Their comments generally were quite favorable; they described the course as being the kind of instruction sought by the inexperienced, newly commissioned officer before he assumes his first command, and as providing a foundation on which he could base his leadership functions without making too many mistakes. Several officers commented that the course should be required for every newly commissioned officer as an introduction to troop duty.

These follow-up reactions are of particular significance as indicators of the probable long-term effects of this training. All too often designers of leadership training have found that training effects are not permanent. A favorable reaction at the end of training becomes negative after a period of time back in the work environment, perhaps because the training is found to be not applicable. However, this does not seem to be the case with the third tryout group of the present study.

The favorable follow-up ratings and comments obtained from this group indicate that these officers probably did find the training useful during the intervening period. It could be inferred that they had tried the new approaches they had been taught and found that they worked. If this was indeed the case, the course accomplished its purpose.

The results of these tryouts support the following conclusions:

(1) The conceptual approach to leadership instruction— emphasizing practical problem-solving activities within a functional context—was well received by student officers.

(2) The practical exercises are considered realistic in that they correspond with problems that are encountered in real leadership situations. This realism led to high student interest in the training.

(3) The results of the training, according to student reports in the follow-up study, are lasting within the time frame tested.

Evaluations by Actual and Potential Users

Actual and potential users who furnished comments included STRAC divisions, TOE divisions, training divisions, ROTC faculties, and service schools. Comments fell generally into four categories:

(1) Comments on student reactions. In general, the actual users commented that students had reacted well, particularly to the practical exercises, and that the students had profited from their experience with the course.[1] As nearly as the research staff could judge from the comments, student reactions reported by different users were substantially the same.

(2) Comments on the student textbook. These reactions were almost uniformly favorable. The spokesman for one service school felt that some of the material was too theoretical and that the language might be hard to understand. However, nearly all reviewers approved of the theoretical approach. Actual users reported no difficulties for students using the text. Final examinations based on text content revealed apparently good understanding of the material by students.

(3) Comments on the practical exercises. Reactions to these also were favorable, reflecting the opinion that the problems depicted are realistic and are an effective aid in teaching the theory of leadership. Actual users reported that the practical exercises elicited good discussions and substantial interest on the part of the students.

(4) Comments on instructors' materials. These comments, obtained only from actual users, were quite favorable. Officers who had served as instructors reported that they had had no difficulty in conducting the course. They also felt that the instructors' materials were sufficiently comprehensive to make special training for instructors

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[1] It is recognized that this reflects only the opinion of the officers who had observed and/or taught the course. Direct evidence that students actually had profited would require the use of behavioral measures, such as observation of the leaders' interactions with their subordinates in work-oriented situations, some time after completion of the OFFTRAIN course.

unnecessary. All actual users were pleased with the completeness of the lesson plans, and with the level of detail in the sections dealing with recommended methods of instruction.

In summary, these comments indicated general agreement that the approach of the course was good and that both student materials and instructor materials were suitable. This last point is especially significant. One major problem in designing leadership instruction is to obtain a standard result at each of the various locations at which it will be taught, without giving special instructor training. Within limits, the OFFTRAIN Program of Instruction seems to have solved this problem.

REFERENCES
AND
APPENDICES

REFERENCES

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9. Sanford, Fillmore H. "Research on Military Leadership," in Flanagan, J.C. (ed.), *Psychology in the World Emergency*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1952.

Appendix A

TOPICS COVERED IN TEXTBOOK:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN SMALL-UNIT LEADERSHIP

Chapter

1 Introduction

2 The Organizational Context of Leadership
  Prediction of Behavior
  Grouping Tendencies
  Social-Recreational Groups
  Differences Between Social and Work Groups
  Satisfaction of the Worker's Needs
  Military and Industrial Groups
  Summary

3 The Functional Role of the Military Leader
  Job Satisfaction and Productivity Level
  Leadership Aspiration
  Characteristics of Social Leaders
  Why Groups Have Leaders
  General Definition of a Leader
  Source of Group Goals
  Generalizations About Groups
  Two Responsibilities of the Military Leader
  The Leader's Two General Functions
  Information for Mutual Need Satisfaction
  Technical Competence
  Rewards and Corrective Actions
  Disruptive Influences
  Summary

4 Setting Platoon Goals and Standards
  Company Organization and the Platoon Leader
  Two Beliefs To Be Developed
  Leader's Guidance Function
  Importance of Accurate and Clear Guidance
  Two Responsibilities in Evaluating Work
  Analysis of Performance Deficiencies
  Making Group Operation Automatic
  Purposes of Explanations
  Summary

Chapter

Chapter

Appendix B

SAMPLE LESSON, INCLUDING CONFERENCE
AND PRACTICAL EXERCISES, FROM INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE

PREPARATION DATA SECTION

1. TITLE:	Conference: Motivating Performance
	Practical Exercises: NCO Use and Support
2. HOURS OF INSTRUCTION:	One (1) hour
3. CLASS PRESENTED TO:	
4. INSTRUCTOR REFERENCES:	<u>Basic Problems in Small-Unit Leadership</u>
	Chapter 5, pp. 23-37 Chapter 6, pp. 39-53
	Summary Sheet for Skit 5
5. INSTRUCTIONAL AIDS:	One (1) Answer Sheet per student for Skit 4, with instructor's comments
	One (1) Taped Skit:
	No. 5. "The New Displays"
	Two (2) Venetian Blind Strip Series:
	No. 4. "Factors Influencing Motivation"
	No. 5. "Important Elements in Use of Rewards and Punishment"
6. STUDENT EQUIPMENT:	None
7. PHYSICAL FACILITIES:	Standard classroom and sound equipment
	One (1) tape recorder
8. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS:	One (1) principal instructor
9. TROOP REQUIREMENTS:	None
10. TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS:	None
11. AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS:	None
12. SPECIAL SOUND EQUIPMENT:	None

13. EVACUATION PLAN: The principal instructor will familiarize himself with the evacuation plan for the classroom or building in which the class is presented.

14. PRINCIPAL INSTRUCTOR'S CHECKLIST FOR PROBLEM REHEARSAL AND PRESENTATION: SOP preclass check of classroom, platform, lights, charts, air conditioning or heating, sound equipment, and after-class clearing of classroom.

15. SAFETY FACTORS: None

16. COORDINATION: As necessary

17. REMARKS: None

OUTLINE OF MATERIAL TO BE PRESENTED

1. What Is Motivation?

2. Why Is a Man Motivated To Work?

3. Factors Influencing Motivation

4. Force as a Means of Motivation

5. Considerations in Motivating Recruits

6. Use of Rewards and Punishment

7. Reacting to Performance Failures

8. Rules for Motivating Performance

9. Skit 5, "The New Displays"

FIFTH HOUR
LESSON PLAN

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q-1.   I WILL NOW POSE A QUESTION WE COVERED EARLIER TO
        SOME EXTENT, SO WE CAN EXPLORE IT A LITTLE MORE
        THOROUGHLY. WHY ARE MEN MOTIVATED TO WORK? WHAT
        GOALS DO THEY SEEK TO ATTAIN THROUGH THEIR WORK?
        (NOTE: DO NOT USE THIS QUESTION IF THE RELEVANT
        MATERIAL WAS THOROUGHLY COVERED IN CLASS DISCUSSION
        DURING THE FIRST HOUR.)

        The answers should be written on a blackboard as they are
        given, if a blackboard is available. This question is covered in
        succeeding paragraphs of the Lesson Plan, and in the text in
        Chapter 3, pages 12-14. Answers should include satisfaction of
        material needs, as well as nonmaterial needs, such as the need
        to feel of value to the society at large. The latter kind of need
        satisfier is quite important for conscientious career men.

Q-2.   DO YOU THINK THESE REASONS APPLY ALSO TO MEMBERS
        OF SMALL MILITARY UNITS?

        This question is covered in paragraph numbers 2 and 5 of the
        Lesson Plan, and in the first half of the text Chapter 5, "Motivating
        Performance." Answers to this question should carefully distinguish
        between career and noncareer soldiers, and the different incentives
        that will prove of value to each.

Q-3.   WE HAVE BEEN TALKING QUITE A BIT ABOUT MOTIVA-
        TION, AND THE INCENTIVES THAT WILL MOTIVATE A MAN
        TO DO GOOD WORK. IN THE ARMY, THERE ARE FOUR LOG-
        ICAL FACTORS THAT WILL DETERMINE THE DEVELOPMENT
        OF A MAN'S MOTIVATION TO DO GOOD WORK. CAN YOU
        IDENTIFY THEM?

        This question is covered in paragraph number 3 of the Lesson
        Plan. The factors are summarized on Venetian Blind Strip Series 4,
        which can be used as a substitute for writing these points on a black-
        board. If this question is used, you must be careful to recognize as
        "correct" student answers that are close approximations to the
        answers you want. When a "close" answer is given, a short restate-
        ment, coupled with display of the appropriate venetian blind strip,
        will be effective.

Q-4.   WHAT EFFECTS WOULD YOU ANTICIPATE FROM THE USE OF
        MANY NEGATIVE INCENTIVES, WITH FEW POSITIVE INCEN-
        TIVES OR NONE AT ALL, TO MOTIVATE PERFORMANCE?

        This question is covered in paragraph number 4 of the Lesson
        Plan, and in the text, pages 29-30.

Q-5.   ONE OF THE CONCLUSIONS WE SEEM TO HAVE REACHED IS
        THAT THE USE OF NEGATIVE INCENTIVES IS A SECOND-RATE
        WAY OF MOTIVATING PERFORMANCE. IF THIS IS TRUE, WHY
        ARE THERE NEGATIVE INCENTIVES AT ALL? ARE THEY
        NECESSARY IN THE ARMY? WHY?

        This question is covered in this part of paragraph number 6
    of the Lesson Plan, and in the text, pages 29-30. The essence of
    the answer is that the Army cannot easily "fire" a man, but still
    must obtain good performance from him. Therefore, the use of
    negative incentives may be the only way to get shirkers to carry
    their "fair share" of the unit's load.

Q-6.   WHY IS IT IMPORTANT FOR EACH MAN IN THE UNIT TO
        PULL HIS FAIR SHARE OF THE LOAD?

        This question is inserted at this point because of its relation to
    the question immediately preceding. It is covered in the text, page 35.

Q-7.   WE HAVE TALKED QUITE A BIT IN THIS HOUR ABOUT NEGA-
        TIVE INCENTIVES. NOW, LET ME ASK YOU A QUESTION
        ABOUT THE USE OF POSITIVE INCENTIVES. SHOULD YOU
        GIVE A TANGIBLE REWARD, SUCH AS A PASS, EXCUSING A
        MAN FROM A FUTURE DETAIL, ETC., FOR EACH SUPERIOR
        PERFORMANCE? FURTHER, IF YOU DO GIVE TANGIBLE
        REWARDS SUCH AS THESE FOR SUPERIOR PERFORMANCES,
        WILL YOUR MEN BEGIN TO EXPECT THEM FOR EVERY
        SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE?

        This question is inserted at this point as an introduction to a
    discussion on obtaining balance in the use of positive and negative
    incentives. The entire section on "Motivating Performance" is
    relevant to this question, particularly "The Value of Recognition
    for Good Work," pages 32-33. This is an issue that your students
    need to have emphasized. If tangible rewards are given for each
    superior performance, there is a good likelihood the men will begin
    to expect them for every future superior performance. This is
    how expectancies are formed; that is, past occurrences, if consist-
    ent, lead to future expectations. Thus, tangible rewards probably
    should not be given consistently, but rather should be given inter-
    mittently for some superior performances, interspersed with
    accurate and appropriate praise for other superior performances.
    Thus, the men will learn that the leader will recognize all superior
    performances, and that some will be rewarded specifically with
    tangible rewards.

Q-8. WHY WOULD A MAN HAVE POOR MOTIVATION TO DO
      GOOD WORK ?

This is a more-or-less summary question asking for an application of material covered earlier in the hour.

a. He is a misfit and thus does not value the positive rewards his good work will earn for him.
b. He expects either that he will not be able to succeed or that his good performance will not be recognized/rewarded if he does succeed.

Of these two, the second is probably by far the more frequent. This attitude can arise if the platoon leader and the NCO's have a poor record of checking performance and of reacting consistently and appropriately to performance that merits positive recognition/reward.

LESSON PLAN

INTRODUCTION

During the second and third hours of this course, we found that the platoon leader's actions in setting goals and standards have great bearing on his platoon's performance. They modify the capability of his unit to achieve assigned goals. If the leader's actions in this regard are effective, they increase the unit's capability. If his actions are ineffective, they decrease the unit's capability by obscuring the goals it is expected to achieve. We found that a platoon leader is constantly setting standards and goals for his platoon, either directly or indirectly, by the actions he takes with regard to the performance of his men.

Of course, capability is not the only important ingredient in performance. Motivation is an essential second ingredient, both for individuals and for units. Good performance is, in fact, the product of both. Neither is sufficient without the other. Consider, for example, a man with a lot of ability but with no motivation to use it. This man generally will not do good work. Similarly, a man with a lot of motivation, but with no knowledge or ability, will also do poor work. The outcome is the same in each case, although the cause is different.

Both of these ingredients are important, but, within the Army, motivation is particularly important. It is quite essential, not only in the actual accomplishment of assigned tasks, but also in learning the required skills initially. It is critical, therefore, that the leader (a) be concerned with how well motivated his men are, and (b) act toward them in a way calculated to produce high motivation.

The platoon leader can have an effect on the motivation of his men in many ways. These can be classed into two general categories for our present purposes. A unit can be motivated either by the use of positive incentives or by the use of negative incentives. During this period, we will discuss examples of positive and negative incentives, how a platoon leader can use these, and the effects they have, both short term and long term, on the motivation of his men.

BODY

1. What Is Motivation ? Perhaps the most familiar illustration of motivation is that of the old man using a fishing pole to hold a carrot in front of his donkey as he rides his cart down the road. In this story, the donkey is always going at a good clip, in contrast to how donkeys usually go. The secret? Well, the donkey has a goal. Because the carrot always seems to go as fast as the donkey, this goal never seems to be achieved, but the donkey keeps trying, anyway.

Let's see if we can apply this kind of concept to a man who is working hard at his job. I am sure you can recall people who were hard workers, perhaps very hard workers. I am talking now about a man who literally submerges himself in his work, who does good work, and a lot of it. I am sure you have

asked yourself, "What is driving that man? Why is he working so hard?"
These questions contain the key to the question of what motivation is.
When you know what is driving the man, you know, in a sense, what
motivates him.

Generally, when men work hard, they want something, although these
wants will vary from man to man. Among platoon members, one man may
be working hard because he wants a pass for a big week end. Another may
work hard because he wants a promotion. Yet another may work hard
because he is afraid the platoon sergeant will yell at him if he doesn't. In
each case, the man wants something. One wants a good time; the second
wants advancement; the third wants peace; and each one is willing to go
to some effort to get what he wants. This is motivation. A man wants
something, or he needs something, and is willing to exert effort to get it.
Thus, motivation is the force that drives a man toward a certain goal. A
good measure of motivation is the effort the individual is willing to exert
in order to achieve this goal.

2. Why Is a Man Motivated To Work? Given that motivation is   Q-1
the force that drives an individual to achieve a certain goal, it is impor-
tant to ask, "Why, then, are men motivated to work? What are the goals
they seek to attain?"

These questions lead us directly to a reconsideration of the material
we discussed earlier on work groups. It is very worthwhile to review this
a second time. You will recall that we spoke then in terms of a part-
nership between the worker and the organization. Both have certain needs
that they can mutually satisfy. They swap effort, so to speak.

This is a vitally important concept. It is very much like that which
underlies the use of money. To illustrate, let me ask you a question.

QUESTION: DO YOU LIKE MONEY?

NOTE: This should evoke affirmative answers.
             The intention is to proceed from an initially
             amusing example to a serious illustration.

That's what I thought you would say. Now, let me ask you another question.

QUESTION: WOULD YOU LIKE LOTS AND LOTS OF MONEY?

I expected you would. Let me add just one word to the question.

QUESTION: WOULD YOU LIKE LOTS AND LOTS OF
                 CONFEDERATE MONEY?

Unless you are a collector of old money, or know someone who is, I think the answer likely is no. Why? It is not worth anything. This answer underlies the whole concept of a medium of exchange. Men work for money because they know it later will buy services or goods for them. The money, in itself, is basically valueless. Similarly, although the work itself may be basically valueless to him, a man works to achieve his organization's goals because this work serves as a medium of exchange for later satisfaction of his own needs.

Of course, especially when a man is handled well, he may develop, over time, a personal interest in organizational goals. If so, he will be a harder worker than otherwise. But, even if he has no personal interest in organizational goals, he will work in order to earn later satisfaction of his own needs.

What this means for you as platoon leaders is very important. In essence, it means that if you know what an individual wants, and if you can provide this for him, and if you do provide it in terms of his performance in your unit, then you can expect him to exert reasonable effort to help you achieve unit goals. This, of course, is related to our discussion topic, yesterday, about whether or not men within your unit are willing to work. The answer then, and the answer now, is that they are, with certain important qualifications we will mention later.

Now, let's examine some of the basic needs that your platoon   Q-2
members are likely to have. I think it is probable that you will have more than one type of individual. Some of your men will be career motivated, your NCO's in particular. They wish to stay in the Army and do well in terms of promotions, increased responsibility, and job security. However, this is not all. In addition to the tangible rewards they get for doing good work, they also want and need certain intangible rewards; for example, they need to feel satisfied with their work. To illustrate, let me mention some of the things that lead to satisfaction. The man needs to feel that his job is important to the unit, for one thing. This helps him feel that he is of some personal worth. This is particularly important. Most men will like someone who likes them. Thus, if the man feels strongly that his unit likes him, he will, in turn, tend to like his unit. Other needs are good leadership, guidance without harassment, and a feeling that he can be friendly with his co-workers. These, I am sure, you will recognize as some of the secondary need satisfiers we mentioned in discussing work groups. They are important for your NCO's as well as for industrial workers.

From this, it is fairly clear what kinds of incentives you could use to produce satisfied and motivated NCO's. However, these things might not work for any of your men who are not career motivated. What, then, would you do to motivate them?

FIFTH HOUR
LESSON PLAN

Men who are not career motivated contrast sharply with those who
are. The goals of the NCO are well identified, and you can provide them.
However, the goals of noncareer men are not nearly so clear. You might
think they want only to get out of the Army. Thus, in the sense in which
we use the term motivation, you might think that most of these men will
not work unless they are forced to work. That is, you might think they
cannot be motivated to work.

This, fortunately, is not actually the case. The basic questions are,
"Are there goals within the Army framework that are desirable to these
men?" and, "Can you provide them?" The answer is a basic yes. One
goal in particular that is highly desirable for these men is a work environ-
ment that is free from undue harassment. The text has a good discussion
of this point, and also of the basic problem of motivating these men by
identifying appealing short-term goals.

These men know that they have no choice but to serve out their terms
of military duty. It is also fairly easy to convince them that they will be
punished if they do not do well. They already expect this, in fact. Given
this belief, then, they realize they must make the best of the situation,
and the way to do this is to do good work. This is a mature viewpoint,
and one you can help your men achieve. They will accept it more readily
if they see that they can better their lots through their own good work.

What can you do to make their good work rewarding? To mention only
a few things, you can:

    (a) Have patience with their errors, as long as they
          are really trying.
    (b) Provide protection from harassment, as long as they
          do well without it.
    (c) Administer treatment that recognizes their dignity as
          fellow humans, as long as they show they deserve it.
    (d) Give support in time of trouble, as long as you know
          they were trying to stay out of trouble and will continue
          to try in the future.

Thus, the basic process in motivating men is repeated. When you moti-
vate a man, you give him something to work for. His work then becomes
valuable to him, and he does it more outstandingly. Almost anyone can be
motivated by an insightful leader.

    3. Factors Influencing Motivation. I believe we are now in a   Q-3
position to summarize a number of factors influencing motivation.

           DIRECTIONS: EXPOSE, AS DISCUSSED, THE APPROPRIATE
                                STRIP OF VENETIAN BLIND STRIP SERIES 4,
                                "FACTORS INFLUENCING MOTIVATION."

The first really important factor is that a man must expect that he can succeed if he tries. This is extremely important. If a man knows he cannot succeed no matter how hard he tries, he may well spare himself the effort involved in trying. If failure is fairly certain, one might as well go ahead and take one's medicine. It, therefore, is quite necessary that a man believe he has some chance of doing what he is supposed to do. The leader can help build this kind of belief by establishing goals that his men have a good chance of achieving.

This illustrates, incidentally, one of the interrelationships between the two parts of the platoon leader's functional role we have considered thus far. Setting platoon goals and standards is extremely important in motivating individuals, because it is important to give a man assignments in terms of his ability to do them. He must have some expectation that he can succeed if he tries.

. Another important factor is the man's expectation that success will help him in achieving some of his own goals. However, let me point out right here that this doesn't mean a man should be rewarded for each and every performance that meets standards. Rewarding performance involves a proper balance between long-range and short-range incentives. So, when we talk about rewarding per- formance, we do not at all mean that you should think up a pass or some privilege for every routine performance, even if done in an outstanding man- ner. If your men know you are aware of their good work, this in itself may be sufficient on a short-term basis. This is an extremely important point that I will talk more about later in the hour.

A third important factor is the value a man places on the recognition he gets for his good work. This takes us back to a point we discussed just a few minutes ago. It is necessary that a man's work be a way to achieve some desired personal goal. If it is not, then he will not want to do the work. This, of course, is exactly the opposite of what we are after. The best use of incentives results in the men's actually wanting to do the work that is expected of them within the platoon.

The final factor is a man's expectation that some corrective action will be taken if he fails to do his work well. This is an unfortunate but necessary final ingredient. As you know, one of the Army's basic problems is the presence of individuals who do not value the rewards the Army can give for their good per- formance. Since their work will not achieve desirable personal goals, they have no motivation to do good work. Consequently, if they can avoid it, they will not do their fair share of the platoon's work. This, of course, the platoon leader cannot permit, because of the eventual deterioration in platoon perform- ance that would result. To understand why this would be the case, look at a shirker from the viewpoint of your men. The platoon has a certain job to do, and each man has a part of that job. If one man fails to do his share, someone else then must do that part of the work, in addition to his own. This will not sit well with him. You will find, almost inevitably, as a result of this, that he will tend to slow down next time so he will not have time to do more than his own work. Or, if

time is not a problem, he will do his own work less well so that he will need to go back and improve it rather than do someone else's. Thus, your unit's performance will gradually edge downward.

Clearly, you cannot have this. You must make the shirkers carry their fair share of the platoon's work from the very beginning. You may have no choice in this but to use negative incentives to force them to do good work.

4. Force as a Means of Motivation. This is an extremely important topic. In essence, what we must ask ourselves is (a) what is the actual effect of negative incentives, and (b) what is the best way to use negative incentives in order to get good performance from your men?

Let's examine, first, what negative incentives do, and how people react to them in everyday life. As I am sure you have already recognized, negative incentives are "goals" that your men do not want to achieve. An example would be the company commander's giving a man extra details because he wasn't sufficiently motivated to do his work right; and, of course, there are always the more stringent negative incentives, such as Article 15 and court-martial.

As you might suppose, your men will definitely seek to avoid these negative incentives. In this statement lies a valuable key to understanding how negative incentives work. A somewhat farfetched example will illustrate. Suppose one of the men in your platoon goes downtown to a club in the hope of finding some dancing. Sure enough, he finds a delightful young woman who is a marvelous dancer; however, her escort is a huge, mean-looking bruiser who seems quite jealous. The young woman is the goal, and her escort is the negative incentive. Therefore, we may characterize negative incentives as barriers to the achievement of certain goals. This is a very good index to their most effective use within the platoon. If negative incentives are strong enough, they are usually effective in preventing your men from doing things you do not want them to do.

So, they are effective as inhibitors of activity; they will quickly dampen a man's enthusiasm for doing something he should not do. But how are negative incentives useful as producers of desirable activity? How will negative incentives lead to good work, considering that we have already said they mainly are of use as barriers?

The answer, of course, is that negative incentives are not efficient producers of good work, and this is the reason they are used as a last resort. The problem is that these negative incentives sometimes can be avoided in some other way than by doing good work, as by having a good excuse. In fact, gold-bricking is the game of the accomplished excuse-maker. The better his excuses are, the harder it is for the platoon leader to apply the negative incentives, and the harder it is to make workable a system founded on the use of negative incentives.

This, incidentally, is the reason negative incentives are no good for all the men in the platoon, even if they must be used with a few. You want your men to

be interested in good performance, not in finding excuses for poor work. You would like them to be interested in doing good work--in part, because they can feel proud of a job well done. This is what motivation actually is. The point is, you can't do this with negative incentives.

If you use only negative incentives, you give your men nothing to   Q-4
work for, only something not to work for. When they are working only
to avoid something worse than the work itself--this is how they will
view it--you will find they get no pleasure from their work; they care
nothing for the quality of their completed assignments. They are driven
by fear rather than by interest.

As I said a minute or so ago, the result will be that, when they can
find excuses, you will get excuses and not good work. In fact, they may
use more energy finding a good excuse than the work itself would have
consumed. You will also find that your supervision time will go up. You
will need to supervise more and more closely, both because you need to
run an ongoing check of events that could serve as excuses, and because
the men just will not work well in your absence. When driven by negative
incentives, you will find that any little unanticipated event will throw
your men into a fit of inactivity. All this is because they have no feeling
for the work itself. They only wish to avoid the negative incentives.
Obviously, this is a poor way to motivate your men. It should be reserved
solely for men who will not work for positive incentives.

Before I go further, I should clear up one important point. When I
say the use of negative incentives is a poor way to motivate your men,
I mean that using negative incentives alone is poor. As we will find shortly,
negative incentives do play an important part in the over-all picture.
However, they must be used with extreme care, and in proper combination
with positive incentives.

      5. Considerations in Motivating Recruits. This brings us to certain
problems of motivating those of your men who were drafted, and, there-
fore, are almost by definition poorly motivated to do good work. Is it, in
fact, true that they are not motivated to do good work? If so, what will be
the role of negative incentives here?

I am sure you will already have answers to these questions, in terms
of the material we have already discussed about why men belong to work
groups, and how to motivate men. We can motivate draftees, in the true
sense of the word, if we can identify positive goals that can be made con-
tingent on their good performance.

The next problem, then, is of casting about to see if we can identify
any such goals. That actually will not prove to be too difficult, as those
of you who have read the chapter on "Motivating Performance" in the text
will know.

Again, look at it from the point of view of the individual soldier. Can you name something he values? Suppose you were being drafted? What would you want?

One thing I can name is the increased freedom generally offered within most units to men who do good work. A man who is judged valuable to his unit receives certain freedoms that the less valuable men do not get. If, for example, his leaders consider him to be highly motivated and capable, he is less closely supervised. If he demonstrates conclusively that he will work well without supervision, he will subsequently be given little supervision. His leaders know that he will do good work in their absence, and that supervising him closely is a waste of time. Freedom from supervision is valuable to the soldier. It is a mark of trust that he values highly.

Another incentive is avoidance of harassment. Many soldiers come into the Army expecting to find harassment a part of their daily lives. If they find that this is not necessarily true and that they can protect themselves from harassment by doing good work, they will be well motivated.

A third motivating force is the belief that his leaders will go to bat for him if he unwittingly violates regulations. The Army's system of rules and regulations is both complex and comprehensive. It is not easy for a man to spend two years in the Army without violating at least one rule. If he can feel that good performance makes him of sufficient value to the unit that his leaders will go to bat for him when this happens, then he will be motivated to do good work.

These are only three things, none of which is tangible or material in nature, but all of which can be powerfully attractive. Thus, they can serve as goals for motivating performance. There are many others you can identify. The basic problem is putting yourself in the place of your men and then asking what they want. Once you have identified goals they consider attractive, you are well on the road to being able to motivate them positively.

6. <u>Use of Rewards and Punishment</u>. What I am going to say now may sound a little like talking in circles. But bear with me. It will, I hope, turn out not to be a circle at all.

<u>DIRECTIONS</u>:   <u>EXPOSE, AS DISCUSSED, THE APPROPRIATE</u>
<u>STRIP OF VENETIAN BLIND STRIP SERIES 5,</u>
<u>"IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE USE OF</u>
<u>REWARDS AND PUNISHMENT."</u>

What we have said to this point is that you should attempt to motivate your men positively, reserving negative incentives only for those men who will not work for positive incentives. Further, we have identified positive incentives that should be effective, even with draftees. Now, it is necessary to say that positive incentives are not enough for men who are not career motivated. The best motivational system must include negative incentives as well as positive incentives; its application must consist of a well-balanced use of both.

Why is this? The answer goes back again to the material on work groups, this time with special emphasis on the way small military units differ from work groups in the usual sense. The main difference, you will recall, is that most soldiers, especially draftees, have terms of service of definite length. This is true for all soldiers except for men on indefinite enlistments beyond a certain point of time.

In industrial work groups, if a man does not do his work, the   Q-5
company merely stops paying him. The unmotivated individual must   Q-6
walk a mighty thin line between what the organization is willing to
accept as adequate, and what he is willing to do to remain a member
of that work group. However, the Army cannot easily rid itself of the
individuals who do not desire to remain in their units. To do so would
reduce its strength drastically, because most of the enlisted men of low
rank do not actually want to be in the Army. This is true almost by defi-
nition, because the vast majority of these men are either draftees or
volunteers who planned from the beginning not to reenlist.

Thus, we have a situation in which threat of loss of membership in
the unit is not actually a threat at all. Consequently, there must be
some other ultimate threat that can be used to obtain good performance
from these men. This must be a system of negative incentives that can
be invoked if needed.

The text has a very complete discussion of this point, particularly
in the section that describes how negative incentives, in conjunction
with positive incentives, are used by parents to socialize their children.
As those of you who have children know, positive incentives are not
enough, although they are vitally necessary. Negative incentives must
also be available to enforce behavior standards. This is not the only
example that can be given. Another would be the system of laws our
society has for handling those who misbehave. Our penal system is one
kind of negative incentive invoked by society to enforce, if necessary,
certain standards of behavior within the society.

What does all this mean with regard to what you should say to your
men, how you should interact with them, and so on, in the actual day-to-
day business of motivating them to do good work?

I think all our experience indicates that the platoon leader can state
his policies on rewards and punishments in a relatively matter-of-fact
manner to his men. It is not really a threat to say that they will be
punished for poor performance; it is a statement of policy. The text makes
clear an important point in this regard. It is necessary that your men
arrive at a mature understanding that their only sensible course is to do
good work, and that their only choice is whether they want to do this to
earn positive incentives or to avoid negative ones.

FIFTH HOUR
LESSON PLAN

I cannot overemphasize the fact that resistance to this kind of motiva-
tional system among your men can only arise from unreasonable standards,
from inconsistency in the enforcement of reasonable standards, or from
initial uncertainty as to what standards are actually to be enforced. My
guess would be that the majority of cases would stem from the last two.

In summary, there must be a set of negative incentives to serve as
a background for the use of positive incentives. These are necessary
because most men cannot be threatened with expulsion from the unit if
they fail to do their work. Consequently, it must be possible to threaten
them with loss of personal freedom for failure to work. However, with
this as a background, positive incentives can be brought heavily into
play. The negative incentives emphasize to the man that he has no
choice but to stay in the situation. This being the case, he can make
things either easy or hard for himself. The positive incentives serve as
ways to make his life easier, and to make his military duty more prof-
itable for himself. Viewed in this light, they can be powerful motivators
of good performance.

Now that we have worked out a relationship between positive and   Q-7
negative incentives, we are in a position to make certain statements
about how to make the over-all system work best.

Perhaps most important is the <u>balance</u> that should exist between
positive and negative incentives. If a good system is worked out, you
will find that you are using positive incentives far more than negative
incentives. If not, you are not using the system right, or some of your
subordinate leaders aren't.

How do you go about working out this system? The answer is to
be found, in part, in our discussion of setting platoon goals and stand-
ards with regard to the group code, the expectations the men form with
regard to your future actions, and how they form these expectations. In
the beginning, it is necessary to say clearly that good performance is
essential. You can even say that you will use the negative incentives
at your disposal, if necessary, to get good performance. But if you do,
don't say this in a threatening manner; make it a matter-of-fact statement.

Once this is clear, make a clear and rigid policy for yourself to
check the quality of <u>all</u> completed work in your platoon and of all the
ongoing work you feel it proper to check. <u>Praise outstanding work</u>
<u>whenever it is found.</u> Merited praise is an extremely important and
effective positive incentive, although this must be used judiciously as
all other positive incentives must be. <u>The praise, or other recognition,</u>
<u>must be made in terms of the effort the man exerted in doing the task.</u>
For routine work, done in a routine manner, there may be little more than
acknowledgment that the work "passes." For outstanding work, special
recognition is warranted.

Two cautions are important here. First, you must not "cheapen" the value of your positive incentives, especially the tangible ones, such as passes, by giving them for routine performance. Second, you must be flexible in the goals you set for your unit. You cannot expect too much, too soon, or you will spoil everything. You should expect gradual improvement, so that each succeeding performance is a little better; therefore, your use of special incentives and special recognition must also be flexible. Over a period of time, as standards gradually creep higher, and as performance also creeps higher, you will find that you are giving special recognition for performances that were previously unattainable. Another word of caution is necessary here, though. Don't use negative incentives to force this improvement. Your men must want to do better, or any improvement you get will not be permanent. So, if you have used positive incentives to get better and better performance, and then find a performance failure, you may decide merely to point out, objectively and nonpunitively, that this performance was not up to the unit's usual standards and that you know they will do better next time. You would not want to use negative incentives for one slip in a series of good performances. I will mention this again in just a minute.

Let me sum up again what we have said about the use of positive and negative incentives.

First, there must be a system of negative incentives; positive incentives must be used against the background formed by these "last resort" negative incentives. Within this context, the use of positive incentives, such as special recognition for outstanding work, develops expectancies in the men that their good work is a source of desirable ends. This gives them something positive to work for.

Next, we also said that the leader must not initially set his standards too high. His standards must always give the men something to work for, but they should be set at a level such that the men will expect they can succeed. The goals should never be so high that they will be considered unreasonable. Further, these goals should be advanced gradually, as the motivation and capabilities of the men also advance. The system should be designed to give the men maximum experience of succeeding when they try, and of being rewarded for their good performance when they do succeed. Further, special recognition should be given only for special performance, never for routine performance; and verbal praise may be one of the most effective ways of giving special recognition. Special recognition is something like special incentive pay to the worker. It is a way of rewarding performance beyond the average.

I will finish this topic with an important caution in the use of praise or other forms of special recognition for good work. Special recognition must not be given to one man in a manner that will tend to make the other members of the unit look bad. An example will illustrate.

As you may know, one part of the mission of a scout platoon is to explore the hostile resistance facing the unit to which the platoon is attached. In one

practice exercise, a certain scout platoon had deployed for this purpose. The sections in the platoon were in assigned sectors and the platoon leader was forward to form a communications link with the battalion. It just happened that one of his sections made contact with the aggressor and did an outstanding job of scouting the aggressor positions and strength in an area that the platoon leader could observe visually, through field glasses. At the end of the exercise, the platoon leader warmly complimented this section leader for a job well done, and awarded him a three-day pass. This was awarded to the section leader alone, however, and not to his men. Further, the platoon leader made no mention of the work of the other sections, although they also had done well.

I am sure you can see what this did to the section leader who received the praise. Although he refused the pass in a futile attempt to save his standing in the platoon, his men were angry about it, and the other section leaders would not speak to him. He was able to win them over, after a period of about ten days, only by catching another section leader alone and threatening a fight if he did not listen to an explanation of the incident from the offended section leader's point of view.

What was the problem? The answer simply was that all the men had done good work. Rewarding one man then was not fair. It was an accident that this particular section had been under the platoon leader's visual observation. The men felt that the performance of all the sections had been equal, and all should have been rewarded equally. When this did not happen, they concluded that rewards were being issued on the basis of something other than performance.

So, the basis for rewards must be clearly established, and fairly administered within the entire unit. This sounds so simple that it must seem trivial, but I can assure you it is not. It is an easy error to make. This platoon leader, for example, never knew that anything had gone wrong.

7. Reacting to Performance Failures. For some time now, we have been talking about problems of reacting to good performance. Another problem is how to react to performance failures. This carries us back, in part, to the discussion topics we had yesterday, in which we distinguished between motivational and ability failures. Both in this discussion, and in the text, indications were clear that it is critically important to distinguish between these two kinds of failures. This distinction has strong implications for how the leader reacts to a specific performance failure in his unit.

One of the major considerations when reacting to performance failure is the individual's past performance history. In this regard, I will introduce a concept I call a "bank account." Good performance can be compared to a deposit in the bank; it increases the individual's worth to his unit. A performance failure is a withdrawal; it decreases his value to the unit. The leader should react to his men in terms of their performance balance. If it is on the credit side, he should be lenient because of the likelihood that the man's performance failures are not

motivational in nature. If it is on the debit side, just the reverse is true. The man's "bank account" is a good index to his motivation. It is also important for a second reason. Very few men can assume they will be able to finish a tour of duty without making at least one or two mistakes. If they can feel their good performance will compensate for unintentional errors, they will be much more highly motivated to perform well; that is, to pile up a large "performance bank account."

Perhaps the most important guidelines to reacting to performance failures are not to lose your temper, and to react <u>consistently</u> in terms of your own standards and the past performance of your men. If you have a well-run unit, performance failures will generally have a reason. Your remedial actions should be taken with knowledge of these reasons. If you react emotionally to performance failures, you will find your ability to think is sharply inhibited. Further, you may find it quite hard to be tolerant, in a situation in which tolerance would be a golden investment.

Q-8

    8. <u>Rules for Motivating Performance</u>. This brings us to a summary of principles we can state for motivating performance.

(a) A platoon leader should clearly and consistently emphasize that quality of performance is the basis for rewards and corrective actions within the platoon.

(b) The platoon leader should respond in a nonemotional and constructive manner to performance failures. He should determine the reasons for these failures, distinguishing between ability and motivational failure.

(c) In the case of ability failures, some form of constructive extra training or other instruction should be given to help improve performance by removing ability deficiencies.

(d) In the case of motivational failures, the platoon leader should take appropriate corrective action. Before doing so, he always should consider both the man's past performance and the severity of the performance failure. The corrective action should be <u>just enough</u> to do the job and no worse; this is more likely to increase motivation than a very harsh corrective action.

(e) Most important of all, the platoon leader should give appropriate recognition to his men for high performance, using both tangible and intangible rewards. The reward given should be appropriate to the amount of effort expended and the difficulty of the tasks.

9. Skit 5, "The New Displays." This completes our formal discussion of the second major part of the platoon leader's functional role, motivating performance. I will now turn to some practical exercises related to a third part of the platoon leader's functional role. To begin our discussion, I will play Skit 5. After you have heard this skit, I will ask you to critique the actions of the platoon leader.

DIRECTIONS: PLAY SKIT 5.

As groups, discuss the effective and ineffective actions of the platoon leader in this skit.

DIRECTIONS: ALLOW GROUPS TIME TO DISCUSS THIS SKIT. THEN SELECT GROUP SPOKESMEN.

I will give you one to two minutes to get a consensus in your groups. Remember to concentrate not only on the platoon leader's effective and ineffective actions, but, also, on the reasons why you make these judgments.

DIRECTIONS: ALLOW ONE TO TWO MINUTES FOR GROUP SPOKESMEN TO OBTAIN THE CONSENSUS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GROUPS. THEN ASK GROUP SPOKESMEN TO STAND AND GIVE THEIR GROUPS' DECISIONS UNTIL MOST OR ALL THE IMPORTANT POINTS HAVE BEEN COVERED.

NOTE: The following considerations should have been taken into account in reaching group decisions.
a. Both the platoon leader and his subordinates suffer when he makes unwise decisions. Thus, it is important to all that his decisions be made wisely and correctly.
b. Whenever a decision needs to be made, and a subordinate questions that decision or offers a countersuggestion, the platoon leader would be wise to investigate further, if at all possible, to get additional information that would help in making the decision. He can be sure that his subordinates make suggestions because they are interested in doing good work. As was indicated, they also have a stake in good platoon performance.
c. If the platoon leader makes unwise decisions, the decisions will likely have a negative impact on his men. If he makes these poor decisions after having received good suggestions from them, they will be highly resentful, as well they might be.

d. It is also important for the platoon leader to
assume responsibility for his errors and mis-
takes when these have had a negative impact on
his men. This generally has good effects for
two reasons. Each man, the leader included,
has certain responsibilities to the group for good
performance. Admission of a mistake is an
implicit statement that one recognizes having
made a mistake and will not repeat it. This is
very important to the group as a whole. If they
can be certain their platoon leader will not make
the same error twice, they can tolerate the initial
error, even though they may suffer from it. The
second point is that they do not have the option of
admitting mistakes they make. They are forced
to do so. When the platoon leader does the same
to them, even though he is protected by his rank
from having to do so, he is voluntarily playing
the game under the same set of ground rules they
must live with. They respect the implicit justice
of this, together with the implication that they are
entitled to the same basic self-respect he is.

e. There is also the matter of cooperation between
the leader and his NCO's. If he successfully
elicits their cooperation in planning how tasks are
to be accomplished, and then uses their sugges-
tions wisely, he very likely will find that these
habits of cooperation will generalize to the
accomplishment of these tasks.

DIRECTIONS: AFTER GROUP SPOKESMEN HAVE COVERED IN
THEIR PRESENTATIONS MOST OR ALL THE
IMPORTANT POINTS, ASK IF THERE IS ANY
FURTHER COMMENT FROM THE CLASS. ALLOW
THIS DISCUSSION TO PROCEED AS LONG AS
IMPORTANT ISSUES ARE BEING DISCUSSED.
WHEN IT APPEARS THAT THE DISCUSSION
SHOULD BE TERMINATED, SUMMARIZE THE
SKIT AND THE HOUR.

SUMMARY

During this hour, we have discussed in some detail many important
factors involved in motivating one's men. As you can see from the material
we covered today, this is an important and never-ending process. We also
discussed today another part of the platoon leader's functional role, that of

utilization of his subordinate leaders. In our next class, we will continue practical exercises in this area.

DIRECTIONS: RETURN STUDENTS' ANSWER SHEETS FOR SKIT 4, WITH INSTRUCTOR'S COMMENTS.

Appendix C

SAMPLE SKIT AND SUMMARY SHEET FROM
PRACTICAL EXERCISES

SKIT 5
THE NEW DISPLAYS

CAST: CAPT JOHNSON, Company Commander
                         LT BLACK, Platoon Leader
                         SFC BYRD, Platoon Sergeant
                         PVT JONES, Platoon Member

SCENE ONE

NARRATOR: The following skit deals with a platoon leader's
                         actions while preparing for an inspection. As the
                         first scene opens, the platoon leader is checking
                         with the platoon sergeant on the men's progress.

LT BLACK: How're things coming along, sergeant?

SFC BYRD: Great, sir. The platoon's doing a good job. Things
                         are beginning to look up!

LT BLACK: Good! Any problems?

SFC BYRD: Just one, sir. It's about the equipment layouts.
                         With your permission, I'd like to make a few
                         changes. I had Private Jones set up a sample.
                         Could you look at it to see if you like it?

LT BLACK: (Lack of concern) Not now, sergeant! I haven't
                         got time. I just stopped by to see how the men
                         were shaping up. As long as the displays are like
                         the one I laid out this morning, they'll be okay.
                         And be sure they're lined up straight!

SFC BYRD: Begging your pardon, sir, but I believe the dis-
                         plays would be more in accordance with
                         regulation if we set them up like Jones has his.

LT BLACK: Sergeant, I know what's regulation, and I don't
                         need any help from Private Jones. Now I want
                         those displays like the ones I set up. Is that clear?

SFC BYRD: Yes, sir!

SCENE TWO

NARRATOR:	The time is five minutes later.
SFC BYRD:	(Loudly) Give me your attention, men! I just had a talk with the lieutenant about the equipment layouts. You'll have to keep them the way they are. They've got to be exactly like the one he set up this morning.
PVT JONES:	But, sergeant, he's not right.
SFC BYRD:	Right or not, we are going to do it the lieutenant's way.

SCENE THREE

NARRATOR:	The time is three hours later. Captain Johnson has just finished inspecting the platoon.
CAPT JOHNSON:	Lieutenant Black!
LT BLACK:	Yes, sir?
CAPT JOHNSON:	The platoon looks very good. You did a good job. The barracks and weapons are in excellent shape, but I'm afraid the equipment displays are not regulation. There's no excuse for this. Sergeant Byrd should know the proper way to lay out the equipment.

(END)

SUMMARY SHEET
SKIT 5
THE NEW DISPLAYS

One of the primary functions of the platoon leader is to receive assign-
ments and directives from higher command levels, interpret these to his
platoon in a manner in which they can be understood, and then see that they
are carried out satisfactorily. Thus, to his platoon he represents the guidance
of higher command; at the same time, he is responsible to his commanders
for the success and failure of his platoon to the extent that this is within his
control. This responsibility involves both training for and the execution of
assigned tasks. Hence, the platoon leader must know the technical details of
what is to be done; he must communicate instructions to the platoon, and then
must supervise and guide their execution of the assigned task. In this skit,
the platoon leader has failed to do this, and his platoon's performance has
suffered as a consequence.

The failure occurred mainly for two reasons. First, the platoon leader
did not know the regulation way to set up a display. This is a deficiency in
technical proficiency, and, as such, will not be dwelt on in this course. It is
relevant at this point mainly because it set the stage for the following ineffec-
tive leadership behavior. Second, the platoon leader rejected his platoon
sergeant's suggestion that another method of setting up displays would better
meet the regulation without first checking to determine whether or not the
sergeant was correct. As will be explained below, this is by far the more
serious of the two reasons listed here.

A newly commissioned officer is placed in a very difficult spot. Platoon
leadership is often his first assignment. It requires leadership skill and tech-
nical competence—in other words, job know-how and the ability to make the
most of it when dealing with his men. However, job know-how, or technical
competence, is not something that is easily acquired. In large part, it is a
function of time and experience on the job. These, of course, are the very
qualifications a newly commissioned officer lacks. It makes it particularly
difficult that his limited experience is emphasized in those fields in which the
job know-how of his senior noncommissioned officers is great. In essence,
the platoon leader is the appointed head of a group of men, some of whom
have a lot more job know-how in certain areas that he does. This raises some
important questions. How can his men be expected to react to a situation in
which they are led by someone who knows less about some technical aspects
of the job than they do? And what can the platoon leader best do about this?

In answering these questions, it is important to note that one big item in
the past experience of the platoon's senior noncommissioned officers is
experience with a variety of platoon leaders. They know what to expect from
a new platoon leader; they also have a good idea as to how fast he should gain
experience. They know, and through them the rest of the men know, that a

new platoon leader cannot be 100-per cent technically perfect. Consequently, they will not hold a lack of knowledge against a new platoon leader particularly in a field such as equipment layout. They will forgive reasonable and honest mistakes. A new platoon leader is allowed time to learn, just as any new recruit expects to be given some time and allowance for mistakes while learning the ropes. The thing that _is_ expected is that the new leader show judgment and common sense, and that he learn rapidly those things he does not already know so he will not make the same mistake twice. This means that platoon members judge the leadership abilities of their platoon leader, not in terms of his detailed job knowledge at the moment, but rather in terms of his potential, in the light of what they think he will know, given time to learn.

In this context, it is apparent that the really big failure of the platoon leader in this skit was not his error in setting up the sample display, but rather his refusal to investigate the merit of the platoon sergeant's suggestion that the displays be done differently. In this case, his lack of good judgment and plain common sense in his handling of this relatively unimportant problem is an example of things that will shake men's trust in a new leader.

Failures of this type are serious to platoon members as well as to the platoon leader. For the platoon leader, the consequences are obvious. The company commander, experienced in these matters, will quickly learn whom to hold responsible, if he does not already know. But the platoon members are also involved in these failures. Everyone wants to belong to a good unit; no one enjoys being part of a poor one. Then, too, if the platoon leader's failure results in a particularly bad showing, the platoon may draw some sort of discipline. Or, at the least, they may be forced to do double work, correcting things that could have been done right the first time. These are hardships they will resent. As the text makes clear, men do not particularly resent discipline which they feel they have fairly earned; however, they bitterly resent discipline which they feel they do not deserve and extra work which they feel is unnecessary.

A key thought to remember is that the platoon's goal is good performance on assigned missions. This is the goal of each individual member of the platoon because each gets both tangible and intangible rewards from seeing a job well done. In this regard, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the performance of the platoon will almost inevitably be bettered to the extent to which the platoon leader can capitalize on the experience, suggestions, and initiative of his men in accomplishing platoon goals.

A final comment on the last scene is necessary. Lieutenant Black could have retrieved, in part, the confidence, respect, and trust of his men by assuming responsibility for having given his platoon incorrect guidance in laying out the equipment displays. This was his only constructive way out. By so doing, he could have shielded his men from the consequences of his error.

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